Abstract
Introduction
One significant attack on sensor node is the insertion of cloned nodes into the network. When ordinary hardware is used, it is easy for an adversary to capture legitimate nodes, make clones by copying them, and place these clones back into the network. Chan and Perrig [7] explain how clones can falsify sensor data, extract data from the network, and stage denial of service attacks. There are several significant constraints in sensor networks. Lightweight processors and low memory device are used. Nodes must also be frugal with their battery power to prolong the lifetime of the network. Sensor network deployed for military purpose has short communication ranges to avoid detection. Because of these constraints, it is a challenge to design a real time clone detection protocol. The goal of our paper is to integrate and discuss these protocols.
Section II of this paper discusses the cloning attacks. Section III presents the overview of the existing clone detection protocols. Section IV discusses the performances and overheads of these protocols. Finally, Section V provides conclusions and possible future extensions to clone detection research.
Clone Attack
In a cloning attack, an adversary may capture a sensor node and copy the information into his own sensors. Then he deploys the clones in places that are intelligently decided. in Several researchers [7] [8] [9] showed a number of attacks that can be made using cloned nodes. Cloned node can leak the information of the network. The adversary can also inject false information, or change data passing through the cloned nodes. It is not possible to constantly monitor nodes to detect potential tampering. Therefore, real time cloned detection is necessary to combat these attacks.
Cloned Node Detection Protocol

A. Randomized Mulicast (RM)
RM requires α to broadcast a location claim to its neighbors β1, β2, .., βd. The location claim has the format[IDα, lα, {H(IDα,lα)} K-1a a ]. Upon hearing this announcement, each neighbor, selects g random locations within the network and uses geographic routing [1] to forward α's claim to the nodes closest to the chosen locations. These are witness nodes which verify the signature of the location claim. Then, it checks the ID against all of the location claims it has received thus far. If it receives two different locations claims for the same node α, it has detected a node replication attack. It immediately floods the network with the pair of conflicting location claims, lα and l′α. Each node receiving this pair can independently verify the signatures and agree with the revocation decision.
B. Line Selected Multicast (LSM)
LSM modifies the RM in the following ways. When α's neighbors send out the evidence of α's location Overview of Wireless Sensor Networks: Detection of Cloned Node Using RM, LSN, SET, Bloom Filter and AICN Protocol and Comparing Their Performances Md. Moniruzzaman, Md. Junaid Arafeen, Saugata Bose claim to the witness nodes, each of the nodes along the route stores a copy of the location claim as well. As for example, let βi send a copy of α's location claim lα to γj via σ1, σ2 . . ,σm. After receiving lα, σk verifies the signature on the claim, checks for a conflict with the claims already in its buffer, stores a copy of lα in its buffer, and then forwards lα to σk+1. If any of the nodes finds another location claim l′α for α such that lα ≠ l′α, then it floods the network with the conflicting set of signed location claims, resulting in a distributed revocation of α.
As the intermediate nodes check for collusion, LSM requires less communication than RM. The adversary can not predict the location of collusion as all protocol decisions are made locally and probabilistically. Therefore, LSM shows fine resilience against node replication.
C. SET
SET consists of five components: exclusive subset construction, authentication of subset covering, distributed set computation and interleaved authentication on subset trees, and verifiable random selection.
Formation of Exclusive Subset
Three states (Init, Ruler, and Ruled) of a node are defined. The base station initiates detection by generating a random seed and broadcasting it to the network. On receiving the seed, every node sets its initial state as Init. There is a hash function H1: (seed | x) → y Є [1. .d] where d is the average degree of a node in the network and x is a node ID. Each node locally computes H1 for itself and its neighbors as it has the list of its neighbors. The node having the largest value, H max , among neighbors becomes a subset leader (SLDR) and changes its state to Ruler.
When a node changes into the Ruled state, it sends a "covered" message (COV) to its neighbors containing its identifier and its SLDR identifier. A subset is composed of a SLDR node and member nodes covered by the SLDR.
Authenticated Subset Covering
To prevent a sensor node from generating a bogus COV message with a fabricated SLDR identifier, Choi et al. used a membership authentication approach. It requires a Ruled node to inform its entire neighbor SLDRs about its covering SLDR.
For example, a node i receives the first ANN message from SLDR g and a second from SLDR h. Node i is covered by g. As presented in the previous subsection, node i sends a COV message (ID= i, SLDR= g) to its neighbors. SLDR h determines that i is not a member of its subset. Node i then transmits the identifier of SLDR h to SLDR g so that SLDR g generates a membership authentication of i to SLDR h. The message that g sends to h is g → h : [i, g, MAC(Kgh, i|g)].
The SLDR h can confirm that SLDR g covers the neighbor i by checking this message and saving MAC(Kgh, i|g), referred to as membership MAC.
During this authentication process, a SLDR collects a set of neighbor SLDRs and shortest path information to them. The maximum distance of shortest paths between two SLDRs is three hops. After this authentication, each SLDR generates a report that includes a set of members, non-member nodes, and a MAC for the report.
A report generated by SLDR g is:
where non-member neighbors ( m 1 )
Verifiable Random Member Selection
If every node's identifier is reported to the base station, it may cause the report packet size to become large near the top of the tree. SET incorporates a verifiable random selection scheme where the base station determines which sensors should be reported. To do this, the base station releases additional information (a bit array of m+1 bits, where m is the maximum value of y=H1(seed|x) computation), referred to as a mbins, when broadcasting the seed. A SLDR generates a report of members whose y-th bit of the mbins is set to 1. For example, if m is seven and the mbin is set to "10101010" (left to right), a SLDR selects members whose y is 0, 2, 4, or 6. The base station can control the number of reported nodes by setting more (or less) bits of the mbins to "1". Since the base station knows the list of all sensors, it can check if the reports include all the sensors to be reported.
Distributed Set Computation on Subset Trees
Each root is decided randomly and initiates tree construction so that multiple trees of subsets are constructed independently and in parallel. The network is also divided into non-overlapping regions. The intersection and union of subsets are performed on each tree in a distributed way. If the intersection of all subsets computed in the base station is empty, there are no clones detected in the network.
Roots are determined by computing another hash function M=H2(seed) Є[1, . . . ,n]. If a subset has at least one node whose identifier is in [M, M + B), the SLDR of the subset becomes a root. Here, B is a system parameter which decides the maximum number of trees constructed in the network. Thus, the adversary is unable to determine roots and the tree structure.
The tree construction starts from each root by discovering the neighboring SLDRs. The root sends a message CTREE containing the root identifier to neighbors. SLDR j becomes a child of another SLDR i from which it receives the first CTREE message if SLDR j is not a root. The SLDR j sets i its parent and sends to i a CTREE RESP message (ID=j, parent=i, root=SID1). When SLDR i receives the CTREE RESP message in which a parent field is set i, it adds j to its children list. A SLDR becomes a leaf on the tree if either it does not have any neighbor SLDR except its parent or all neighboring SLDRs except the parent already joined a tree. For each child, the same tree extension is performed recursively. When the leaf SLDR sends its subset report at the end of tree construction, the parent computes the intersection of these subsets to check the existence of a clone. If not detected, it generates a union of its children's subsets and sends this new report to its parent. Each root forwards its final report which is the union of all subsets in a tree to the base station. If the intersection in the midst of the tree is not empty, this implies that clones exist in the sub tree. The base station will be notified of the existence of the cloned node and it will take further action.
Interleaved Authentication on a Subset Tree
When a SLDR sends a report to its parent, it computes keyed MAC for both of its parent and grandparent (interleaved MAC). If a corrupted parent changes the results of set operations, the grandparent can detect the inconsistency by computing and checking the interleaved MACs.
The report is different based on whether a SLDR is a leaf or an intermediary on the tree. Let us denote i, p, and g as child, parent, and grandparent SLDRs respectively, and Si as a subset of child i. Leaf SLDR i generates a subset report composed of its subset, MAC of the subset report for its parent, and interleaved MAC for its grandparent. 
Detection at the Base Station
Each root forwards its final report (union of all subsets in a tree) to the base station. The base station verifies the reports from roots by checking MACs generated by roots and interleaved MACs by their children. The base station detects the clone attack by computing the intersection of any two received subsets from roots. If it detects cloned nodes, it may revoke the corresponding nodes by broadcasting the list of cloned identifiers to the network.
SET efficiently detects cloned node while requiring less message transmission than LSM. It also provides distributed load sharing among the nodes in the network.
D. Clone detection using Bloom Filter
Each of the N nodes has a key ring of k keys taken randomly from the pool. A base station BS is outside the network with a copy of the entire key pool. Every node has a public key that can be used to communicate securely with the base station.
The clone detection procedure is as follows. First, each node constructs a counting Bloom filter [6] from the keys it uses for communication and appends a random number, nonce, to the filter. The node encrypts the filter using BS's public key and forward it to BS. BS discards the messages with duplicate nonce. By decrypting the message, BS counts the number of times each key is used in the network.
A Bloom filter is an approximate representation of a set that supports membership queries. It is a vector of m bits. Initially, all bits in the vector are set to 0. Each member of the set is hashed using h hash functions each with range [1, . . ,m]. The bit corresponding to each hash value is set to 1. A bit might be set more than once. Membership queries hash an element with the h hash functions. If the corresponding bit positions in the filter vector are all 1, the element is said to be a member of that set. There is a quantifiable false positive probability (an element found to be a member of the set even though it is not). The number of hash functions h and the vector-size m are chosen to keep the false positive 
(I)
where n is the number of elements in the set [6] . The Bloom filter size is determined mainly by the false probability rate the sensor network is able to tolerate. The base station BS does membership queries on the decrypted Bloom filters it receives. BS knows both the keys and the hash functions. BS hashes every key using all the hash functions to obtain a set of bit sequences. XOR operations are used to test if a key j is used in filter l.
Suppose a sensor network has n nodes active in a region. μ0 and s2 are mean and variance for the number of times noncloned keys are used in the network. The key pool contains P keys and each node has a key ring of k keys chosen at random from the pool. From [3] , the probability of connection P between any two nodes in this network is
The expected number of times a key is used for communications in the network is μk=∑nj=1Mj*(Nj/Mj)/P with variance, Vk=∑nj=1Mj*(Nj/Mj-μk)2/P In the clone detection protocol, legitimate connections are reported twice; once by each node using the connection.
Therefore, μ0=2* μk (II) S2=4*Vk (III) Suppose, Ui is the number of times key i is used to establish connections gathered using Bloom filters. If Ui is significantly higher than μ0, it is likely that the key is being used by cloned nodes. Here are two hypotheses. H0 : key is uncloned and Ha : key is cloned The decision criterion is based on the expected Type I and Type II error rates. A Type I error occurs when Ha is accepted but H0 is true; it occurs with probability α. Type II error occurs when Ha is rejected but Ha is true; it occurs with probability β. α and β are inversely proportional.
Given the Central Limit Theorem, one can create a normal curve based upon (II) and (III) to represent the usage distribution of uncloned keys. Thus, given a particular Ui, one can determine the probability that key i fits within the normal curve. Any key used more than T times is labeled as a clone.
The protocol can remove all cloned keys from the network when a high value of α is used. However, care must be taken to use a value of α that does not fracture the network. It also works better when k is small. Its ability to detect clones increases with the number of clones.
E. AICN
The adversary first compromises a sensor node; then he copies the node and inserts the cloned node into the network. R. Lu, X. Lin, C. Zhang, H. Zhu, P. Ho and X. Shen [13] propose the protocol Algorithm to Identify Compromised Node (AICN) for centralized base station or sink node. AICN is based on four trust assumptions and one Lemma which are discussed in the following sections.
Trust Assumptions
Assumption 1: The sink S equipped with tamper-proof devices is trustworthy. All sensor nodes N = {N1,N2,...,Nn} are able to report their sensing results to the sink S through the pre-defined routes.
Assumption 2: Each sensor node N i Є N is inexpensive, and easily compromised by an adversary. The compromised sensor node behaves abnormally while the uncompromised sensor node behaves normally. 
Lemma 1
Let F(x) be a function that denotes whether the sensor node x is compromised, which is 1 if x is compromised node, and 0 otherwise. Formally, F(x) ={1,x Є Nc and 0, x Є Nd Let J (x, y) denote the event that the sensor node x Є  N provides the recommendation on the status of another sensornode y Є   N. J(x,y) = 1 indicates x considers y is a compromised node and J(x,y)= 0 shows x considers y is a normal node. So, Lemma 1: J(x,y) =1→ (F(x)F(y))=1 (Proof in [13] )
Description of AICN Algorithm
Based on the trust assumptions, the proposed AICN can be described in the following steps.
Step 1: The sink S places all nodes N={N1, N2, N3} in Set A, renumbers them, and forms an array, N1 → N2 → • • → Nn-1 → N n. The right and left neighbor of each node N i Є  N are:
RightNeighbor (Ni ) = {Ni+1,1<=i<=n-1 and N1 , i=n LeftNeighbor(N i ) = {Nn, i=1 and Ni-1 , 2<=i<=n
Step 2: Starting from the sensor node N1 , the sink S inquiries each node's opinion on its right neighbor one by one, and the corresponding inquired node will report its opinion back to the sink S. The report of node N i is subject to the format: J(Ni, RightNeighbor (Ni))={1, Ni believes its right-neighbor is compromised and o, otherwise Suppose the node N j is the first one who reports J(Nj, RightNeighbor (Nj))=J(Nj, Nj+1) Then, according to Lemma 1, we know F(NJ) F(NJ+1)=1In this case, the sink S runs the following operations:
i) Move the pair-sensor (Nj, Nj+1) from Set A to Set B ii) Choose Nj 's old LeftNeighbor( Nj ) = Nj-1 and old RightNeighbor(Nj +  ) = Nj +2 and set Nj   - 's new right-neighbor as Nj   +2  , that is RightNeighbor(Nj  - ) = Nj+2
iii) Inquiry Nj-1 's opinion on its new right-neighbor Nj  -2  . Following the operations in Step 2, the sink S continues to inquire the sensor nodes until reaching the rear of array.
Step 3: In the end, after (n − 1) queries, there are β pair sensors in Set B, and α (α ≥ 1) sensor nodes in Set A such that α+2β = n. According to the operations in
Step 2, each node in Set A believes its right-neighbor is a normal node, and each left node in Set B trusts that its right-neighbor is a compromised node.
In order to illustrate the rest of the algorithm, the following four facts are introduced. Let nac, nad be the number of the compromised nodes and the normal nodes in Set A, nbc, nbd be the number of the compromised nodes and the normal nodes in Set B, respectively. All the four facts have been proved in [13] .
Fact 1: nbc ≥, nbd, the no of compromised nodes is larger than or equal to the no of normal nodes in Set B.
Fact 2: nac < nad, the no of compromised nodes is less than the no of normal nodes in Set A.
Fact 3: If α = 1, the only sensor node in Set A must be a normal node.
Fact 4: If α ≥ 2, then in Set A, the last two sensor nodes in the array must be normal.
On the basis of the above four facts, the sink S perform the following operations:
i) If α = 1, then the only sensor node in Set A is a normal node. Then, the sink S inquires the node by launching a number of β = n-1/2 queries on β pair sensors in Set B. Note that in this case, only one node in each pair-sensor is compromised in Set B; otherwise, it will contradict with nc < nd. Therefore, after totally n-1+ n-1/2= 3n-3/2 queries, the sink S can distinguish all the compromised nodes N c from the normal ones N d.
ii) If α ≥ 2, the last two nodes in the array are normal ones. The sink S can inquire the last node with at most n −2 queries on other sensor nodes ' status. Therefore, in this case, after launching at most n −1+n−2 = 2n −3 queries, the sink S can distinguish all the compromised nodes N c from the normal nodes N d .
By observing the above two cases, it can be sufficiently concluded that in AICN, the sink S can judge the status of each sensor node within at most 2n − 3 queries.
Performances of These Protocols
A sensor node has also limited memory which is 4KB for MICA2 [12] . Therefore, any protocol designed for sensor network should consider these constraints. RM shows good resilience, since it prevents the adversary from anticipating the identity of the witness nodes. However, it incurs a high communication cost O(n2 ). Memory overhead of RM is O(√n).
Communication and memory overhead of LSM are O(n√n) and O(√n ).
Simulation shows that LSM detects cloned node for different network configuration like L, Large H and Uniform [4] with the average probability 83%, 86% and 76% each. SET requires less communication which is O(n). In SET, if the T trees are generated, each root maintains approximately (n / T) identifiers, each of which is 12 bits. The protocol that uses Bloom filter removes most of the cloned node from the network at a value of α = 0.48 for grid networks. The protocol is more effective for the ad hoc topology. At α = 0.60, all clones are eliminated when 90 or more clones are introduced. Communication overhead of this protocol is O(n logn). While, AICN requires the base station sending (2n-3) queries to detect the compromised nodes.
Conclusion
Inexpensive hardware and unattended deployment make the individual sensor node vulnerable to compromise. Among the thousands of deployed node, it is not possible to predict which and how many nodes will be the target by the adversary. Therefore, a distributed detection is necessary to resist the compromised nodes and their clones. This paper provides an overview of the existing protocols for clone detection, each of which offers different advantages and disadvantages. Clone detection still requires a great deal of research work. Specially, the detection algorithm should be able to tolerate a small number of malicious participants. They should also be adapted for mobile sensor network.
